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MISSING AFTER MENSING: A REMEDY FOR 
GENERIC DRUG CONSUMERS 
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in PLIVA v. Mensing 
left consumers of generic drugs without a remedy for failure-to-warn 
claims. The Court held that FDA regulations made it impossible for a ge-
neric drug manufacturer unilaterally to enhance its warning label. Be-
cause of this impossibility, the Court held that the FDA regulations pre-
empt state failure-to-warn claims. The FDA regulations do not, however, 
preempt brand name drug consumers’ claims against brand name drug 
manufacturers. Accordingly, consumers stand in starkly different posi-
tions depending on whether they consumed a brand name or a generic 
drug. This Note argues that the FDA should amend its regulations to al-
low all manufacturers unilaterally to enhance their warning labels. This 
would allow both generic and brand name consumers to recover from the 
manufacturer that produced the inadequately-labeled drug that was con-
sumed. 
Introduction 
 Drug manufacturers spend billions of dollars every year research-
ing and developing new drugs.1 To recoup the invested money, these 
companies aggressively market their brand name drugs to doctors and 
patients directly.2 New drugs typically enjoy a twenty-year patent, during 
which the patent holder has the exclusive right to manufacture and 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: 
New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. Health Econ. 166, 166 (2003) (estimating that 
the fully capitalized total research and development cost of a new drug is $802 million); 
Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2011, Pharmaceutical Res.& Manufacturers of Am., 11 
(Apr. 2011), http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/159/phrma_profile_2011_final.pdf 
(estimating total biopharmaceutical industry research and development spending at $67.4 
billion in 2010). Consumers also spend billions of dollars to purchase prescription drugs. See 
National Health Expenditures 2010 Highlights, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ 
NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2012) (estimating 
that U.S. retail prescription drug spending was $259.1 billion in 2010). 
2 See Allen Rostron, Prescription for Fairness: A New Approach to Tort Liability of Brand-Name 
and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 60 Duke L.J. 1123, 1133 (2011) (citing Marc-André Gag-
non & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion Ex-
penditures in the United States, 5 Pub. Libr. Sci. Med. 29, 31–32 (2008) (estimating that in 
2004, U.S. pharmaceutical companies spent $57.5 billion on marketing—almost twice as 
much as they spent on research and development)). 
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market their brand name drug.3 After the patent expires, however, 
competing manufacturers often create generic duplicates of the drugs 
and sell them at a much lower price.4 If a generic drug manufacturer 
can prove that its drug is effectively identical in substance and labeling 
to the brand name drug, then the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA)—the sole regulatory body responsible for ensuring the safety 
and efficacy of pharmaceutical drugs on the market—will allow the ge-
neric manufacturer to forego the rigorous clinical testing required of 
the brand name drug.5 
 Largely due to generic substitution laws, generic drugs account for 
the vast majority of drugs consumed.6 Every state has some form of ge-
neric substitution law that allows (and in some instances requires) 
pharmacists to fill prescriptions with a cheaper generic drug unless the 
doctor specifically requests the brand name drug.7 As a result, even 
though many doctors prescribe the brand name drug with which they 
are familiar,8 approximately seventy-five percent of prescriptions are 
filled with generics.9 
 The FDA requires new drugs to undergo extensive clinical testing 
before they can be marketed.10 Nonetheless, plaintiffs sometimes bring 
                                                                                                                      
 
3 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 
Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 717, 722–23 (2005). 
4 See Anthony L. Martin, Jr., California Dreamin’? Generic Drug Users Can Sue Brand Name 
Drug Manufacturers, 77 Def. Couns. J. 474, 475 (2010). 
5 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2006); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing (Mensing III ), 131 S. Ct. 
2567, 2574 (2011). 
6 See U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Expanding the Use of Generic Drugs 
5 (2010) [hereinafter HHS Report], available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010/ 
genericdrugs/ib.pdf (“The rate of generic prescribing for all prescriptions reached almost 
75 percent in 2009, up from 57 percent in 2004.”). 
7 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); HHS Report, supra 
note 6, at app. A (providing a chart of all fifty states’ generic substitution laws). Fourteen 
states—Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia—require a 
pharmacist to substitute a generic drug unless a physician affirmatively indicates other-
wise. HHS Report, supra note 6, at app. A. 
8 See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Sarah P. Bryan, Beware Those Bearing Gifts: Physicians’ Fi-
duciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57 U. Kan. L. Rev. 491, 506 (2009) (“Despite 
the fact that over 70% of prescriptions are written for drugs for which both generic and 
brand name versions are available, fewer than 30% of prescriptions are written for the 
generic version.”); Judith K. Hellerstein, The Importance of the Physician in the Generic Versus 
Trade-Name Prescription Decision, 29 RAND J. Econ. 108, 108 (1998). 
9 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
noted in her dissent in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing (Mensing III ) 
decision that this number rises to ninety percent when a generic version is available. See id. 
10 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A); How Drugs Are Developed and Approved, U.S. Food & 
Drug Admin. (last updated Apr. 23, 2010), www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApproval 
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claims that the labeling of a drug provided inadequate warning of the 
drug’s known or foreseeable risks.11 When the plaintiff consumed a 
brand name drug, that plaintiff successfully can sue the brand name 
manufacturer who created the drug’s warning label.12 But what hap-
pens to the seventy-five percent of prescriptions filled with a generic 
equivalent—a product manufactured by a different company but using 
the inadequate warning label created by the brand name manufac-
turer?13 
 On June 23, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court held in PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing (Mensing III ) that FDA regulations preempted state tort law 
failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers.14 As a result, the 
decision effectively foreclosed suits against generic manufacturers be-
cause the Supreme Court stated that FDA regulations made it impossi-
ble for a generic manufacturer to enhance its warning label unilater-
ally.15 The Court noted that even if a generic manufacturer notified the 
FDA of its drug’s risks, it could not fulfill its state law duties unless it 
actually enhanced its label—an action which federal regulations pro-
hibit.16 Moreover, it is unclear whether these plaintiffs can sue the 
brand name manufacturers for the inadequate warnings.17 The major-
ity of courts to address this issue have held that generic consumers 
cannot successfully sue brand name manufacturers.18 Consequently, 
                                                                                                                      
 
Process/HowDrugsAreDevelopedandApproved/default.htm (illustrating the process for 
bringing a new drug to market). 
11 See, e.g., Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2573 (bringing a claim against a generic manufac-
turer); Wyeth v. Levine (Levine III ), 555 U.S. 555, 559 (2009) (bringing a claim against a 
brand name manufacturer). 
12 See Levine III, 555 U.S. at 558–59, 581. 
13 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2581. Mensing III provides the answer: these plaintiffs’ 
claims against generic manufacturers are pre-empted by federal FDA regulations. See id. 
14 Id. (holding that it is impossible for generic manufacturers to comply with their fed-
eral duty to keep the labeling the same as the brand name drug and their state duty to 
update labeling to ensure it provides an adequate warning); see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(G) 
(stating that a generic drug’s label must be the same as the brand name drug’s label for 
approval); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iii) (2012) (same); 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10) (ap-
proval may be withdrawn if a generic drug’s labeling stops being consistent with the brand 
name drug’s label). 
15 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2581; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(G); 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.94(a)(8)(iii); 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10). 
16 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2581; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(G); 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.94(a)(8)(iii); 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10). 
17 See e.g., Smith v. Wyeth, 657 F.3d 420, 424 (6th Cir. 2011) (denying a generic con-
sumer’s claim against the brand name manufacturer); Metz v. Wyeth LLC, 830 F. Supp. 2d 
1291, 1295 (M.D. Fla. 2011). 
18 See, e.g., Smith, 657 F.3d at 424; Hogue v. Pfizer, Inc., 2012 WL 4466609, at *5 (S.D. 
Ohio Sept. 27, 2012); Baymiller v. Ranbaxy Pharm., Inc., 2012 WL 3929768, at *8–9 (D. 
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patients who consume generic drugs appear to be without a remedy if 
they are harmed by inadequate warning labels.19 
 This Note argues that the FDA should rewrite its regulations to 
allow all manufacturers unilaterally to enhance their labeling, and thus 
allow all manufacturers to be subject to state failure-to-warn claims.20 
Part I explains the FDA’s regulatory scheme and the differences be-
tween pre-market and post-market safety risk identification.21 Part II 
examines how two recent Supreme Court cases interpreting FDA regu-
lations have effectively granted a remedy to brand name consumers, 
but have foreclosed a remedy for generic consumers.22 Finally, Part III 
argues that to ensure continued drug innovation and to maintain state 
law tort principles, the FDA should amend its regulations to allow both 
brand name and generic manufacturers to be subject to state law liabil-
ity for failing to provide adequate warning labels.23 
I. The FDA’s Regulatory Scheme 
 This Part explains the FDA’s regulatory scheme designed to ensure 
the safety and efficacy of drugs.24 First, Section A briefly describes the 
role of the FDA, and then summarizes the process for obtaining ap-
proval to market new drugs.25 Next, Section B explains the approval 
process for generic equivalents of existing drugs.26 Finally, Section C 
examines the requirements for both brand name and generic manufac-
                                                                                                                      
Nev. Sept. 6, 2012); Phares v. Actavis-Elizabeth LLC, 2012 WL 3779227, at *7–11 (S.D. Tex. 
Aug. 30, 2012); Lashley v. Pfizer, Inc., 2012 WL 2459148, at *11 (S.D. Miss. June 27, 2012); 
Phelps v. Wyeth, 857 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1130 (D. Or. 2012); Guarino v. Wyeth LLC, 2012 
WL 1138631, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2012); Metz, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 1295; Gross v. Pfizer, 
2011 WL 4005266, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 7, 2011). But see Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 
694, 709 (D. Vt. 2010); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 168 Cal. App. 4th 89, 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2008). 
19 See Metz, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 1295 (“Tellingly, the Supreme Court in Mensing appeared 
to contemplate that consumers of generic drugs may be without a remedy when it noted ‘the 
unfortunate hand that federal drug regulation has dealt [consumers of generic drugs].’” 
(quoting Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2581)). 
20 See infra notes 181–256 and accompanying text. Once such a system is in place, then 
a consumer will be able to sue whichever manufacturer—brand name or generic—actually 
manufactured the drug consumed. See infra notes 181–256 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 24–73 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 74–180 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 181–256 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 28–73 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 28--48 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 49--59 and accompanying text. 
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turers to monitor adverse reactions to the drug after its initial ap-
proval.27 
A. The Role of the FDA and Pre-Market Approval of New Drugs 
 The FDA is responsible for, among other things, ensuring the safety 
and efficacy of drugs sold in interstate commerce.28 As part of these du-
ties, the FDA evaluates applications for new drugs, regulates the labeling 
of prescription and over-the-counter drugs, and sets drug manufactur-
ing standards.29 The FDA’s role as regulator of food and drugs dates to 
1906, when Congress passed the Federal Food and Drugs Act to combat 
the repulsive conditions in the meat-packing and other food indus-
tries.30 In 1938, Congress enacted the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(“FDCA”), which was much more comprehensive than the 1906 Act, 
and which gave the FDA much of its regulatory authority.31 Most signifi-
cantly, the FDCA added the requirement for premarket approval of new 
drugs.32 
 Today, the FDA has a more important role than ever, as the num-
ber of drugs on the market has mushroomed to 11,000.33 As the sole 
regulatory body responsible for ensuring the safety and efficacy of 
drugs sold in the United States, the FDA provides an important barrier 
to keep unsafe drugs off the shelves.34 Because of the massive number 
of drugs under the FDA’s purview, the onus for testing the safety and 
                                                                                                                      
27 See infra notes 60--73 and accompanying text. 
28 See Michelle Meadows, Promoting Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 Years, U.S. Food & 
Drug Admin. (last updated June 18, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/ 
History/ProductRegulation/PromotingSafeandEffectiveDrugsfor100Years/default.htm. 
29 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)–(e) (2006) (setting forth procedures and requirements for 
new drug applications to the FDA, including labeling and manufacturing requirements); 
21 C.F.R. § 211 (2012) (setting drug manufacturing standards). 
30 See Federal Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, 38 Stat. 768, 768–72 (1906) (repealed 
1938); FDA History—Part I, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (last updated June 18, 2009), http:// 
www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054819.htm; FDA’s Origin, U.S. 
Food & Drug Admin. (last updated June 18, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/What 
WeDo/History/Origin/ucm124403.htm (adapted from A Historical Guide to the U.S. 
Government, (George Kurian ed., 1998). 
31 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040, 1040–59 (1938) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)); FDA History—Part II, 
U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (last updated Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ 
WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054826.htm. 
32 Levine III, 555 U.S. at 566. 
33 See id. at 578. 
34 See Meadows, supra note 28. 
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efficacy of drugs falls on the drug’s manufacturer, both before and af-
ter the product becomes available.35 
 To protect their significant investment in newly developed drugs, 
drug originators typically enjoy twenty years of patent protection from 
competition.36 A patent provides the patent holder with the exclusive 
right to manufacture the drug for a period of time.37 Because the pub-
lic values new drug innovations, Congress provided drug patents to in-
centivize the innovation of new drugs.38 The drug originators generally 
market their drugs heavily as brand name drugs in order to recoup 
their investment (and try to earn a profit) during the patent term, 
while they do not face competition from generic drugs.39 
 Obtaining FDA approval to market a new drug is costly and time-
consuming, reducing the effective patent term to eleven to twelve 
years on average.40 A drug innovator will typically file a patent appli-
cation as soon as it discovers a new drug that meets the patent statu-
tory requirements of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness.41 To gain 
FDA approval, a drug originator must first perform laboratory and 
                                                                                                                      
35 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2006); Levine III, 555 U.S. at 578; 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b) 
(2012) (describing steps a manufacturer must take to update its labeling based on safety 
and efficacy changes after the drug becomes available). 
36 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). The patent term begins running from the time of 
the patent application. See id. 
37 Id. § 154(a)(1). 
38 See id. § 154(a)(2). The Hatch-Waxman Amendments also allow for up to a five-year 
patent extension. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 723; see 35 U.S.C. § 156. 
39 See Gagnon & Lexchin, supra note 2, at 31–32; Saami Zain, Sword or Shield? An Over-
view and Competitive Analysis of the Marketing of “Authorized Generics,” 62 Food & Drug L.J. 
739, 746 (2007) (discussing how some brand name manufacturers—who lose fifty to eighty 
percent of their sales once a generic competitor enters the market—attempt to continue 
reaping profits beyond the patent term by producing “authorized generics”). 
40 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2574 (“Meeting [the FDA] requirements involves costly 
and lengthy clinical testing.”); Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on Pharmaceutical Intellectual 
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 93, 96–97 (2004) (arguing for increased pharmaceutical intel-
lectual property protection in order to foster innovation and describing the effective pat-
ent term as eleven to twelve years on average); The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs 
Are Safe and Effective, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (last updated May 1, 2012), www.fda.gov/ 
drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm. 
41 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (utility), 102 (novelty), 103 (non-obviousness); Le-Nhung McLe-
land, What Every Chemist Should Know About Patents, Am. Chemical Soc’y, 13 (3d ed. 2002), 
http://portal.acs.org/portal/PublicWebSite/about/governance/committees/WPCP_006903 
(listing reasons for drug innovators to file a patent application as soon as practicable). Start-
ing with patent applications filed on or after March 16, 2013, the U.S. patent system will 
change from the present “first-to-invent” system to a “first-inventor-to-file” system, which will 
create an additional incentive to file a patent application as soon as practicable. See Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
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animal testing followed by small-sample clinical testing on humans.42 
There are three stages to the clinical trial schedule, with each stage 
testing a relatively larger sample of people.43 At the conclusion of the 
clinical trials, the drug originator can submit a New Drug Application 
(“NDA”) to the FDA.44 In 2009, these clinical trials accounted for ap-
proximately fifty-eight percent of total research and development costs 
among members of the Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers of 
America (“PhRMA”).45 
 As part of the NDA, the manufacturer must provide the proposed 
adequate and accurate labeling of the drug.46 This labeling must re-
flect, among other things, any “reasonable evidence of an association of 
a serious hazard with a drug,” even if no evidence of a causal relation-
ship between the drug and the hazard exists.47 The FDA reviews the 
NDA and makes a decision as to whether to permit the drug originator 
to market the drug.48 
B. Pre-Market Approval of Generic Drugs 
 To encourage the production of generic drugs, Congress passed 
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (the 
“Hatch-Waxman Amendments”) in 1984, which allows generic drug 
manufacturers to bypass the extensive clinical testing required for 
brand name drugs upon a showing of bioequivalency to the brand 
name drug.49 Thus, when a brand name drug’s patent expires, other 
manufacturers can produce generic duplicates of the drug without the 
rigorous testing standards, if they can prove that their drug is the bio-
                                                                                                                      
42 See Development and Approval Process (Drugs), U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (last updated 
Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/default.htm. 
43 See id. 
44 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring that manufacturers seeking FDA ap-
proval provide “full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or 
not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use”); id. § 355(d) (re-
quiring “adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not such 
drug is safe for use”). 
45 See Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2011, supra note 1, at 45. PhRMA is a pharmaceu-
tical trade group that represents many of the largest pharmaceutical research companies 
in the United States. About PhRMA, Pharmaceutical Res. & Manufacturers of Am., 
www.phrma.org/about/phrma (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
46 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). 
47 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2576; 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e) (2012). 
48 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (listing grounds for refusing an application). 
49 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A); supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text (describing 
the extensive process to bring a brand name drug to market). 
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equivalent of the previously approved, brand name drug.50 Congress 
created this exception for generic manufacturers in 1984 by passing the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments, which created the process for abbrevi-
ated new drug applications (“ANDAs”).51 In passing the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments, Congress chose to free generic manufacturers 
from having to duplicate safety and effectiveness data that a brand 
name manufacturer had already submitted to the FDA.52 These 
amendments allowed generic drugs to be produced more cheaply than 
when generic manufacturers had to perform the same rigorous clinical 
tests as the brand name manufacturers.53 In fact, in contrast to the es-
timated $802 million in research and development costs to bring a 
brand name drug to market, today a generic drug costs roughly two 
million dollars to bring to market.54 
                                                                                                                     
 In addition to proving the bioequivalence of the generic drug to 
the brand name drug, a generic manufacturer must also use the same 
labeling as the brand name drug.55 The FDA’s definition of “labeling” 
is broader than simply the label on the drug bottle; it also includes vir-
tually any dissemination of information by the drug manufacturer, 
 
50 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2574. The FDA defines bioequivalence as “the absence 
of a significant difference in the rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active 
moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at 
the site of drug action when administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions 
in an appropriately designed study.” 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e). 
51 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 28 
U.S.C., and 35 U.S.C.); Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2574. 
52 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (setting forth the requirements for generic manufacturer appli-
cations); Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing on S. 2748 
Before the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman 
Hearing] (opening statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on Labor and 
Human Resources). Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, the FDA had two sets of 
rules for the marketing of generic drugs, depending on whether they were approved be-
fore or after the 1962 amendments to the FDCA. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857(II), at 4 (1984), 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688. For drugs approved before 1962, for which a 
manufacturer only had to prove safety, but not efficacy, generic manufacturers could sim-
ply submit ANDAs. See id. For drugs approved after 1962, however, which required a show-
ing of safety and efficacy, the generic substitutes had to duplicate the previously approved 
tests of the brand name manufacturers. See id. As a result, manufacturers had a reduced 
incentive to create generic substitutes because of the high costs of clinical testing. See id. 
53 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2574. 
54 See Henry G. Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and 
Biotechnology Industries, in Science and Cents: Exploring the Economics of Biotech-
nology 92 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Dall. ed., 2003); Big Generic Pharma, Economist, July 28, 
2005, at 58. 
55 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (requiring “information to show that the labeling pro-
posed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the listed drug”). 
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packer, or distributor to medical professionals.56 The purpose of this 
requirement is to avoid consumer confusion and to convey to consum-
ers that the generic and brand name drugs are the same.57 
 Since the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, generic 
drugs have become an even more important component of the drug 
market, with approximately 75% of all prescriptions filled with gener-
ics, compared with 19% before the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.58 
The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that generic drugs save 
consumers between eight and ten billion dollars per year.59 
C. Post-Market Risk Identification 
 After the FDA approves a drug, both brand name and generic 
manufacturers must continue to monitor adverse reactions to the drug 
and identify new risks.60 In addition to the adverse events reported to 
them directly, manufacturers must also review the scientific literature 
relating to their drugs.61 Upon acquiring new information, brand 
name manufacturers have a state law duty to update their labels to warn 
consumers of newly-discovered risks.62 There are three methods for 
changing a label, depending on whether the change is “major,” “mod-
erate,” or “minor.”63 Although FDA regulations require both brand 
name and generic manufacturers to notify the FDA of the post-market 
risks they have identified, a generic manufacturer cannot use any of the 
                                                                                                                      
56 See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(2) (2012). 
57 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4, Mensing III, 
131 S. Ct. 2567 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501) [hereinafter U.S. Mensing III Brief] (quoting 
FDA, Division of Generic Drugs, Policy and Procedure Guide 37 (1989)). 
58 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
59 Cong. Budget Office, How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has 
Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry, at xiii (1998), avail-
able at http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf. In 
2009, the average retail price for a prescription generic drug was $39.73, seventy-six per-
cent less than the $155.45 average retail price for a prescription brand name drug. U.S. 
Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Expanding the Use of Generic Drugs 5 (2010), 
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010/genericdrugs/ib.pdf. 
60 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (obliging manufacturers to review and report adverse reac-
tions that occur after bringing the drug to market). 
61 Id. § 314.80(b), (d). 
62 See Levine III, 555 U.S. at 581. By contrast, in Mensing III, the Supreme Court held 
that FDA regulations preempt state law failure-to-warn claims against generic manufactur-
ers. 131 S. Ct. at 2581. 
63 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)–(d). 
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label-changing procedures except to match a change that the brand 
name manufacturer has effected.64 
                                                                                                                     
 “Major” changes to labeling require FDA approval before the 
changes can be implemented.65 Changes are considered major as a de-
fault, unless they fall into one of the excepted categories.66 To effect a 
major change, a manufacturer must submit a supplemental application 
detailing the proposed change and providing a description of the stud-
ies performed and the data derived from such studies.67 
 “Moderate” changes to labeling can be effected without prior FDA 
approval through the “changes-being-effected” (“CBE”) process, but the 
FDA retains the authority to reject the change.68 A manufacturer can 
use the CBE process to strengthen its warning label when it discovers 
new risks.69 Although a manufacturer may effect such a label change 
unilaterally, the FDA may subsequently reject the change and order the 
manufacturer to cease distribution of the drug with the new labeling.70 
 Finally, a manufacturer can make “minor” changes to the labeling 
without FDA oversight.71 Minor changes include changes in the descrip-
tion of the drug (not involving a change in dosage strength or form) or 
editorial changes in the labeling.72 A manufacturer must document the 
 
64 Id. § 314.80 (setting forth post-market reporting requirements for brand name 
manufacturers); id. § 314.98 (requiring generic manufacturers to comply with 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.80); see Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2577. In Mensing III, the U.S. Supreme Court reiter-
ated that “[t]he FDA’s views are ‘controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 
the regulation[s].’” 131 S. Ct. at 2575. The FDA, in turn, construes its regulations to pro-
hibit a generic manufacturer from using either the major change prior approval process or 
the moderate-change CBE process (the standard processes that govern major and moder-
ate changes to FDA labels), except to conform its label to a brand name manufacturer’s 
label change. U.S. Mensing III Brief, supra note 57, at 15–18. Although the FDA did not 
address the minor change process in its brief, its reasoning on major and moderate 
changes likely also extends to prohibit generic manufacturers from making minor changes 
except to conform to a brand name manufacturer’s label change. See id. 
65 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b). 
66 Id. § 314.70(b)(2)(v). 
67 Id. § 314.70(b)(3). 
68 Id. § 314.70(c). For example, a brand name manufacturer should use the CBE proc-
ess to strengthen its warning label if it becomes aware that a specific method of administer-
ing its drug is significantly more dangerous than an alternative method of administration. 
See Levine III, 555 U.S. at 573. 
69 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii). A contraindication advises against the use of the drug 
by certain people who, because of a certain characteristic, have a “substantial risk” of being 
harmed by using the drug. See id. § 201.80(d). 
70 Id. § 314.70(c)(7). 
71 Id. § 314.70(d). 
72 Id. § 314.70(d)(2)(ix)–(x). 
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label change in an annual report, but may make the change unilater-
ally.73 
II. Different Remedies for Brand name and Generic Consumers 
 Two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions establish that brand 
name drug consumers may sue brand name manufacturers, but generic 
drug consumers cannot successfully sue generic manufacturers.74 Sec-
tion A of this Part reviews these two cases, and also examines the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals’ treatment of the issue during the time between the 
two cases.75 Section B then examines the separate yet related question 
of whether a generic consumer can sue a brand name manufacturer.76 
A. Levine III and Mensing III Establish Differences in the Duty to Warn 
Consumers for Brand Name and Generic Drug Manufacturers 
 In two recent cases, the Supreme Court has interpreted how the 
FDA regulations on brand name and generic labeling interact with state 
tort law duties to provide adequate warnings to customers.77 As a result 
of these two cases, the viability of claims for brand name consumers ver-
sus generic consumers is vastly different.78 First, in the 2009 case, Wyeth 
v. Levine (Levine III ), the U.S. Supreme Court held that FDA regulations 
did not preempt state law failure-to-warn claims against a brand name 
manufacturer.79 Following the reasoning of Levine III, lower courts gen-
erally held that such claims against generic manufacturers were similarly 
not preempted.80 In 2011, however, the U.S. Supreme Court in PLIVA v. 
Mensing (Mensing III ) held that FDA regulations preempted such claims 
against generic manufacturers because—unlike brand name manufac-
                                                                                                                      
73 Id. § 314.70(d). 
74 See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing (Mensing III ), 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581 (2011) (holding that 
FDA regulations preempt state claims against generic manufacturers); Wyeth v. Levine 
(Levine III ), 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009) (holding that FDA regulations do not preempt state 
claims against brand name manufacturers). 
75 See infra notes 77–148 and accompanying text. 
76 See infra notes 149--180 and accompanying text. 
77 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2581; Levine III, 555 U.S. at 581. 
78 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2581; Levine III, 555 U.S. at 581; Erwin Chemerinsky, Su-
preme Court Review: A Devastating Decision, 47 Trial 54, 57 (2011) (describing the result of 
the two decisions as “treat[ing] generic drugs dramatically different from their brand 
name equivalents”). 
79 See Levine III, 555 U.S. at 581; infra notes 82–100 and accompanying text. 
80 See Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharm. Co., 630 F.3d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. 
Ct. 497 (2011); Demahy v. Actavis, Inc. (Demahy II ), 593 F.3d 428, 449 (5th Cir. 2010), 
rev’d, Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. 2567; Mensing v. Wyeth (Mensing II ), 588 F.3d 603, 614 (8th 
Cir. 2009), rev’d, Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. 2567. 
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turers—generic manufacturers could not unilaterally update a label and 
therefore it was impossible to comply with both state and federal obliga-
tions.81 
 In Levine III, the plaintiff consumed a brand name drug and sued 
the brand name manufacturer.82 Wyeth’s brand name drug, Phenergan, 
is used to treat nausea; it can be administered intravenously through 
either an “IV-push” method directly into a patient’s vein, or an “IV-drip” 
method in which it is introduced into saline solution before slowly en-
tering a patient’s vein.83 When the drug enters a patient’s artery instead 
of a vein, it causes irreversible gangrene.84 In Levine III, the plaintiff, 
Diana Levine, had to have her forearm amputated because Wyeth’s 
drug entered her artery.85 Levine sued Wyeth for failing to provide an 
adequate warning of the risks of intravenous injection of its drug.86 
 Levine argued that the labeling on Phenergan was defective be-
cause it failed to instruct physicians to use the IV-drip method rather 
than the riskier IV-push method.87 Although Wyeth’s Phenergan label 
warned of the risk of the drug entering an artery, it did not alert physi-
cians that the IV-push method created a much higher likelihood of this 
result.88 During Levine’s five-day jury trial, the evidence showed that 
the IV-drip method “almost entirely eliminated” the risk of the drug 
entering an artery.89 The jury entered a verdict for Levine, which the 
Vermont Supreme Court affirmed.90 
 In affirming the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision in favor of 
Levine, the U.S. Supreme Court first rejected Wyeth’s impossibility pre-
emption argument.91 Specifically, Wyeth had argued that it was impos-
sible for it to comply with both federal regulations prohibiting unilat-
eral changes in labeling and the state-law duties underlying failure-to-
                                                                                                                      
81 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2581. Unlike brand name manufacturers, generic manu-
facturers cannot unilaterally update their warning labels. See id.; supra notes 64–69 and 
accompanying text. 
82 See Levine III, 555 U.S. at 559. 
83 See id. at 559. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. at 559–60. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. at 560. 
88 See Levine III, 555 U.S. at 560. 
89 See id. at 561. 
90 Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 197 (Vt. 2006) (affirming jury verdict); Jury Verdict, 
Levine v. Am. Home Prods., Inc., No. 670-12-01, 2004 WL 5388972, at *1 (Vt. Sup. Mar. 12, 
2004) (awarding the plaintiff $7.4 million). 
91 Levine III, 555 U.S. at 573. Impossibility preemption occurs “where compliance with 
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate 
commerce.” Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). 
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warn claims.92 Therefore, Wyeth argued, FDA regulations preempt 
state failure-to-warn claims.93 The Court rejected this argument, con-
cluding that Wyeth had a duty to provide adequate labeling and that 
the FDA’s “changes-being-effected” (“CBE”) regulation enabled Wyeth 
to comply with this duty.94 Notably, the Court held that the CBE regula-
tion permitted Wyeth, as a brand name manufacturer, unilaterally to 
strengthen its warning label.95 Accordingly, the Court held that it was 
not impossible to comply with state duties to provide adequate warn-
ings and federal duties under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
s by further motivating manufacturers to create adequate 
labels.100 
                                                                     
(“FDCA”).96 
 The Court in Levine III also rejected Wyeth’s “purposes and objec-
tives” preemption argument.97 Wyeth had contended that Congress’s 
purpose in enacting the FDCA was to allow an expert federal agency to 
create both the floor and ceiling of drug regulation.98 The Court dis-
agreed with this characterization of Congress’s purpose.99 Instead, it 
concluded that FDA regulations create merely the floor for drug label-
ing requirements, and that state failure-to-warn claims complement the 
regulation
                                                 
ne III, 555 U.S. at 563, 568. 
yeth 
first
brand name manufacturers’ ability to enhance their labels unilaterally. 131 
S. C
he full purposes and objectives of Con-
gres  (1941). 
U.S. at 563–64, 573. 
 
92 See Levi
93 See id. 
94 See id. at 568–73; supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (describing the CBE regu-
lation). Wyeth argued that it could not have employed the CBE regulation because Levine 
did not show that there had been any new analysis in the time between the FDA’s 1998 ap-
proval of Phenergan’s labeling and Levine’s injury in 2000. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Levine 
III, 555 U.S. 555. Wyeth referred to language in the CBE regulation that allows changes in 
labeling only “to reflect newly acquired information.” 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (2012); see 
Brief for Petitioner, supra, at 10. The Court, however, stated that Wyeth could have re-
analyzed the accumulating information about the risks of Phenergan since the time W
 notified the FDA in 1967 after the first such incident. Levine III, 555 U.S. at 569–70. 
95 Levine III, 555 U.S. at 573. In 2011 in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing (Mensing III ), the U.S. 
Supreme Court distinguished brand name manufacturers from generic manufacturers 
because of the 
t. at 2581. 
96 Levine III, 555 U.S. at 573. 
97 Id. at 581. Purposes and objectives preemption occurs when a state law “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of t
s.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
98 Levine III, 555 
99 See id. at 563. 
100 See id. at 577–78; Keith N. Hylton, An Economic Perspective on Preemption, 53 B.C. L. 
Rev. 203, 217, 223 (arguing for a preemption model that predicted that Levine’s claims 
would be preempted because the Court had information available to it that was not avail-
able to the FDA). In support of this conclusion, the Court noted that despite a 1976 en-
actment of an express preemption provision for medical devices, Congress did not enact a 
similar provision for drugs. See id. at 574. The Court also declined to defer to the preamble 
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 Although Levine III solely concerned brand name drug labeling, 
the three circuit courts to address Levine III’s subsequent impact on ge-
neric labeling all held that FDA regulations do not preempt state law 
claims against generic manufacturers.101 In all three cases—Gaeta v. Per-
rigo Pharmaceuticals Co. in 2011, Demahy v. Activis (Demahy II ) in 2010, 
and Mensing v. Wyeth (Mensing II ) in 2009—the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
for the Ninth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit respectively held that it was not 
impossible for generic manufacturers to comply with both the FDA 
regulations and their state law duty to warn.102 
 Using the same rationale as Levine III, the three circuit courts held 
that FDA regulations did not preempt failure-to-warn claims against 
generic manufacturers.103 Although the Supreme Court did not distin-
guish between brand name and generic drugs in its analysis, all three 
circuit courts recognized that different regulations govern brand name 
versus generic manufacturers.104 Specifically, all three courts noted that 
generic manufacturers have a duty of “sameness” —that is, a duty to use 
the same labeling as their brand name counterparts.105 Nonetheless, all 
three courts held that generic manufacturers were able to comply with 
FDA regulations in the same manner as brand name manufacturers.106 
                                                                                                                      
of a 2006 FDA regulation that purported to preempt state failure-to-warn claims. See id. at 
575; Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and 
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934–35 ( Jan. 24, 2006) (preamble). The Court 
noted that the preamble did not go through notice-and-comment rule-making, and that 
Congress did not authorize the FDA to preempt state law directly. See Levine III, 555 U.S. at 
577. 
101 See Gaeta, 630 F.3d at 1227; Demahy II, 593 F.3d at 449; Mensing II, 588 F.3d at 614. 
102 See Gaeta, 630 F.3d at 1227; Demahy II, 593 F.3d at 449; Mensing II, 588 F.3d at 614. 
103 See Levine III, 555 U.S. at 568–81 (reasoning first that it was possible for brand name 
manufacturers to comply with federal and state law duties, and second that state law did 
not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal law); Gaeta, 630 F.3d at 1227; 
Demahy II, 593 F.3d at 449; Mensing II, 588 F.3d at 614. 
104 See Levine III, 555 U.S. at 570–71 (declining to distinguish between brand name and 
generic manufacturers in a discussion of a manufacturer’s responsibility for the content of 
its warning label); Gaeta, 630 F.3d at 1229 (recognizing that different regulations govern 
generic and brand name manufacturers’ applications to the FDA); Demahy II, 593 F.3d at 
436 (same); Mensing II, 588 F.3d at 606 (same). 
105 See Gaeta, 630 F.3d at 1229 (“At any time after a new generic drug is approved, the 
FDA reserves the right to withdraw approval if it determines that the generic drug's label-
ing is ‘no longer consistent’ with that of the listed drug.”); Demahy II, 593 F.3d at 432 
(“ANDA drugs must be the ‘same as’ a name brand drug that has already been approved 
by the FDA as to . . . conditions of use recommended in the labeling.”); Mensing II, 588 
F.3d at 606 (“ANDA applicants must show the FDA that . . . their proposed label is in rele-
vant part identical to the name brand drug label.”). 
106 See Gaeta, 630 F.3d at 1227; Demahy II, 593 F.3d at 449; Mensing II, 588 F.3d at 614. 
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 In rejecting the generic manufacturer’s impossibility preemption 
defense, the circuit courts held that generic manufacturers had three 
possible ways to update their labels.107 First, under the prior approval 
process (which is required for “major” changes), generic manufactur-
ers could submit proposed changes to the FDA, which could review the 
changes and then require “sameness” between the brand name and 
generic labeling.108 Second, generic manufacturers could employ the 
CBE process, which does not distinguish between brand name and ge-
neric manufacturers.109 Finally, generic manufacturers could send 
“dear doctor” letters directly to physicians warning of the drug’s dan-
gers.110 Accordingly, the circuit courts held that it was not impossible to 
ns preempted 
     
comply with both state and federal law, and that FDA regulations there-
fore did not preempt state claims against generic manufacturers.111 
 On December 10, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari 
for two of these circuit court cases—Mensing II and Demahy II— consoli-
dating the two cases into Mensing III.112 Although the three circuit court 
cases agreed on the result, there was a split among the district courts 
that had addressed the issue.113 Mensing III reversed the Fifth and 
Eighth Circuit’s opinions and held that the FDA regulatio
                                                                                                                 
107 See Gaeta, 630 F.3d at 1227; Demahy II, 593 F.3d at 449; Mensing II, 588 F.3d at 614. 
108 See Demahy II, 593 F.3d at 444 (“Nor does anything in the FDCA or Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments explicitly forbid generic manufacturers from proposing a label change 
thro




g II, 588 F.3d at 614. 
 See Gaeta, 630 F.3d at 1227; Demahy II, 593 F.3d at 449; Demahy II, 593 F.3d at 431 n.7 
(list
ugh the so-called prior approval process.”); 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b) (2012); supra notes 
66–67 and accompanying text (describing the prior approval process). 
109 See Gaeta, 630 
R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A)–(D); supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (describing 
the CBE process). 
110 See Gaeta, 630 F.3d at 1231; Demahy II, 593 F.3d at 440; Mensing II, 588 F.3d at 611. 
Manufacturers sometimes send “dear doctor” letters to physicians to warn of dangers of a 
drug or to alert them to changes in labeling. See 21 C.F.R. 200.5 (setting standards for 
“dear doctor” letters); U.S. Mensing III Brief, supra note 57, at 7–8. Although dear doctor 
letters fall within the FDA’s broad definition of labeling and are therefore subject to FDA 
oversight, the circuit courts noted that “the FDA made clear that the requirements ‘do not 
prohibit a manufacturer from warning health care professionals whenever possibly harm-
ful adverse effects associated with the use of the drug are discovered.’” See, e.g., Demahy II, 
 F.3d at 444 (quoting Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content and Fo
Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,447 ( June 26, 1979)). 
111 Gaeta, 630 F.3d at 1227; Demahy II, 593 F.3d at 449; Mensin
112 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 817, 817 (2010) (granting certiorari); Actavis, 
Inc. v. Demahy, 131 S. Ct. 817, 817 (2010) (granting certiorari). 
113
ing numerous district court decisions on each side of the issue); Mensing II, 588 F.3d at 
614. 
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th state tort law duties of generic manufacturers.e 
ere prescribed Reglan, they were given the 
ene
erm use of metoclopramide can 
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4, the FDA approved a Reglan manufacturer’s 
                                                                                                                     
114 In effect, Mensing 
III denies a failure-to-warn remedy to generic consumers.115 
 The facts in the two consolidated cases that Mensing III decided— 
Mensing II and Demahy II—were similar.116 In both, the plaintiffs, 
Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy, were prescribed Reglan, a brand 
name version of the drug metoclopramide, which is designed to 
speed the movement of food through the digestive system.117 Al-
though both plaintiffs w
g ric version of metoclopramide by their pharmacists and took the 
drug for several years.118 
 Both plaintiffs developed tardive dyskinesia, a neurological disor-
der resulting in “grotesque involuntary movements of the mouth, 
tongue, lips, and extremities, involuntary chewing movements, and a 
general sense of agitation.”119 Since the drug first entered the market 
in 1980, studies have found that long-t
ca e tardive dyskinesia.120 As a result, the labeling on the drug has 
been enhanced at least three times.121 
 The warning label was first strengthened in 1985, adding that 
“tardive dyskinesia . . . may develop in patients treated with metoclo-
pramide,” and that because the drug had not been evaluated for use 
longer than twelve weeks, it could not be recommended for an exten-
sive term of use.122 In 200
request to change the label to add that “[t]herapy should not exceed 
12 weeks in duration.”123 
 





substituted [the generic drug] instead, federal law pre-empts these lawsuits. 
Id. 
3. 
31 S. Ct. at 2572–73. 
72. 
granted certiorari to the remaining circuit court case, Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharmaceuticals 
Co., vacating the judgment and remanding the case to the Ninth Circuit for furthe
ration in light of Mensing III. L. Perrigo Co. v. Gaeta, 132 S. Ct. 497, 497 (201
 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2581. The majority opinion recognized that: 
[F]rom the perspective of [the plaintiffs], finding pre-emption here but not 
in Wyeth makes little sense. Had [the plaintiffs taken] the brand name drug 
prescribed by their doctors, Wyeth would control and their lawsuits would not 
be pre-empted. But because pharmacists, acting in full accord with state law
116 Id. at 2573. 
117 Id. at 2572–7
118 Id. at 2572. 
119 Id. at 2573. 
120 Id. at 2572. 
121 Mensing III, 1
122 Id. at 25
123 Id. 
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 It was not until 2009, approximately two years after the plaintiffs in 
these actions filed their original suits, that the FDA ordered the label-
ing to include its strongest warning: a black box warning.124 This warn-
ing stated that “[t]reatment with metoclopramide can cause tardive 
ysk
h Circuits 
d name manufacturer seeking new drug approval is re-
on
collective meaning of several regulations taken together.133 In reversing 
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ decisions, the Supreme Court relied 
heavily on the FDA’s own interpretation of its regulations, as presented 
                                                                                                                     
d inesia, a serious movement disorder that is often irreversible. . . . 
Treatment with metoclopramide for longer than 12 weeks should be 
avoided in all but rare cases.”125 
 In 2007 and 2008, respectively, Mensing and Demahy filed sepa-
rate suits against the generic manufacturers of metoclopramide, alleg-
ing a failure to provide adequate warnings of the risks of long-term 
use.126 Although the two district courts deciding the cases reached di-
vergent conclusions,127 on appeal both the Fifth and Eight
held that FDA regulations did not preempt the plaintiffs’ state law 
claims.128 Therefore, under these circuit court opinions, Mensing and 
Demahy could successfully sue the generic manufacturers.129 
 It is undisputed that a generic drug’s label must be the same as its 
brand name counterpart when it is first approved by the FDA.130 
Whereas a bran
sp sible for the accuracy and adequacy of its label, a generic manufac-
turer simply must show that its label is identical to the brand name 
drug’s label.131 
 The parties disagreed, however, on whether generic manufacturers 
may change their labels after initial FDA approval.132 Without a regula-
tion specifically on point, the parties and the Court had to interpret the 
 
124 Id. at 2573. 
125 Id. 
126 Demahy v. Wyeth (Demahy I ), 586 F. Supp. 2d 642, 644 (E.D. La. 2008); Mensing v. 
Wyeth (Mensing I ), 562 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1057–58 (D. Minn. 2008). 
127 Compare Demahy I, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 662 (holding that FDA regulations do not pre-
empt state law failure-to-warn claims), with Mensing I, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 1064–65 (holding 
that FDA regulations preempt state law failure-to-warn claims). 
128 Demahy II, 593 F.3d at 449; Mensing II, 588 F.3d at 614. 
129 Demahy II, 593 F.3d at 449; Mensing II, 588 F.3d at 614. 
130 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2574. 
131 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2006); see id. § 355(j)(4)(G) (declaring that one 
ground for not approving an ANDA is that “information submitted in the application is 
insufficient to show that the labeling proposed for the drug is the same as the labeling 
approved for the [brand name] drug referred to in the application”); Mensing III, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2574. 
132 Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2574. 
133 See id. at 2574–75. 
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in the United States’ amicus brief, to show that generic manufacturers 
could not unilaterally change their labeling.134 
 First, the Court accepted the FDA’s seemingly inconsistent inter-
pretation that although the CBE process applied to generic manufac-
turers, generic manufacturers could not use the CBE process unilater-
ally to update a warning label as state law would require.135 Thus, 
unlike brand name manufacturers that can unilaterally enhance a 
warning through the CBE process (subject to the FDA’s subsequent 
approval), generic manufacturers can only use the CBE process to up-
date a label to match a brand name manufacturer’s updated label.136 
The FDA maintained that the CBE process is simply the procedure that 
a generic manufacturer could use to change a label, but that the con-
tent of the label change is governed by the statutes and regulations re-
quiring “sameness” among generic and brand name labels.137 Finding 
that the FDA’s interpretation of its own regulations was not “plainly er-
roneous,” the Court deferred to the FDA and concluded that the ge-
neric manufacturer could not meet its state law duty through the CBE 
                                              
process.138 
 Second, the Court determined that generic manufacturers could 
not send “dear doctor” letters to fulfill their state law obligations.139 
The FDA maintained that sending a letter from only a generic manu-
facturer—without a comparable letter from the brand name manufac-
turer—would imply that the two drugs were different in some re-
                                                                        





of t  is “no longer consistent with” that of the brand name drug). 
134 See id. at 2575–76 (relying on the FDA’s own interpretation of its regulations to 
conclude that the generic manufacturers could not have used the CBE process or sent the 
sort of “dear doctor” letters the plaintiffs envisioned). 
135 Id. Generic manufacturers are
ropriate circumstances. 21 C.F.R. § 314.97 (2012) (requiring generic manufacturers to 
comply with 21 C.F.R. § 314.70); see id. § 314.70(c) (describing the CBE process). 
136 Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2575. 
137 U.S. Mensing III Brief, supra note 57, at 15–16. Specifically, the FDA maintained that 
even after a generic drug’s ANDA has been approved, the substantive regulations and stat-
utes governing the original ANDA continue to govern its supplements, such as those filed 
through the CBE process. Id; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(G) (2006) (stating that the FDA 
may deny an ANDA if a generic drug’s proposed labeling is not the “same as” the brand 
name drug); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iii) (governing the content of an ANDA an
that proposed labeling be the “same as” that of the brand name drug); 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.150(b)(10) (stating that the FDA may withdraw approval of an ANDA if the labeling
he generic drug
138 Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2575–76 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) 
(setting forth the standard for deferral to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations)). 
139 Id. at 2576. 
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spect.140 Because such a difference would be “misleading,” the FDA 
may withdraw its approval of the generic drug’s ANDA.141 Thus, federal 
law did not permit the generic manufacturer to fulfill its state law duty 
l duty demanding that its label 
e th
rs could successfully sue the brand name 
manufacturers instead.148 
                                                                                                                     
through “dear doctor” letters either.142 
 Given that the generic manufacturers could not unilaterally 
change their labeling, the Court found that it would be impossible for 
the generic manufacturers simultaneously to comply with state and 
federal requirements.143 The Court found that even if a generic manu-
facturer had fulfilled its federal duty to notify the FDA of the drug’s 
risks, it would not have fulfilled its state law duty to provide adequate 
labeling.144 To satisfy the requirements of state law, the generic manu-
facturer would have had to actually change its label—not simply re-
quest that the FDA change it—but, according to the Court, it could not 
have done so without violating its federa
b e same as the brand name label.145 
 As a result of the Mensing III decision, consumers cannot sue ge-
neric manufacturers for failure to warn.146 Even the majority’s decision 
recognized the inanity of this result: “We acknowledge the unfortunate 
hand that federal drug regulation has dealt Mensing, Demahy, and 
others similarly situated.”147 After Mensing III, the question became 
whether generic consume
 
140 Id. The FDA did not argue that generic manufacturers could not send “dear doc-
tor” letters as a general matter; they could, but only if the letter conformed to the re-
quirements for a generic drug’s labeling. See U.S. Mensing III Brief, supra note 57, at 18–19. 
That is, because “dear doctor” letters qualify as labeling under the FDA’s definition, the 
labeling must be “consistent with and not contrary to” the brand name drug’s labeling. Id. 
(quoting 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d)(1)). 
141 Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2576; 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(3); U.S. Mensing III Brief, su-
pra note 57, at 19. 
142 Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2576. 
143 Id. at 2576–77. 
144 Id. at 2577–78. The FDA agreed with the plaintiffs that generic manufacturers do 
have a duty to report new information about risks to the FDA. Brief for Respondents 
Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy at 15, Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 
09-1501) [hereinafter Mensing III Brief for Respondents]; U.S. Mensing III Brief, supra note 
57, at 15. Nonetheless, the Court did not address the issue, stating that preemption would 
exist even if such a duty existed. Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2577. 
145 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2578. 
146 See Chemerinsky, supra note 78, at 54 (“[I]njured patients now generally must sue 
on a theory other than failure to warn.”). 
147 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2581. 
148 See Metz v. Wyeth, 830 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1294–95 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (holding that 
generic consumers cannot recover from brand name manufacturers and noting that the 
Court in Mensing III appeared to contemplate this outcome). 
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B. Generic Consumers’ Actions Against Brand Name Manufacturers 
 Prior to Mensing III, courts were nearly unanimous in denying ge-
neric consumers’ failure-to-warn claims against brand name manufac-
turers despite the wide variety of legal theories that plaintiffs argued.149 
The underlying argument in each of the claims was that prescribing 
physicians rely on the labeling and marketing provided by the brand 
name manufacturer, regardless of whether the patient actually con-
sumes the brand name or generic version of the drug.150 
 In the seminal case on this issue, the 1994 case Foster v. American 
Home Products Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
held that a brand name manufacturer cannot be held liable for injuries 
resulting from the use of a generic manufacturer’s product.151 In that 
case, six-week-old Brandy Foster died suddenly, allegedly as a result of 
taking the generic equivalent of the brand name drug Phenergan.152 
The child’s parents sued Wyeth—the manufacturer of Phenergan—for 
negligent misrepresentation.153 
                                                                                                                      
149 See, e.g., Howe v. Wyeth Inc., No. 8:09-CV-610-T-17AEP, 2010 WL 1708857, at *3–4 
(D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2010) (denying claims for negligence, strict products liability, breach of 
express and implied warranties of merchantability, negligent misrepresentation and 
fraudulent concealment, negligence per se, and loss of consortium); Couick v. Wyeth, Inc., 
691 F. Supp. 2d 643, at 645–46 (W.D.N.C. 2010) (denying claims for negligence, breach of 
undertaking a special duty, misrepresentation by omission, negligent misrepresentation, 
constructive fraud, fraud by concealment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress, unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, breach of express warranty, and breach of implied warranties). 
150 See, e.g., Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees at 37, Foster v. Am. Home Prods. 
Corp., 29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994) (No. 93-1627) (arguing that it was foreseeable to the 
brand name manufacturer that its conduct would cause harm to generic consumers when 
prescribing physicians rely on the communications from the brand name manufacturer). 
151 29 F.3d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1994); see Metz, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 1295 (noting that the 
Fourth Circuit’s holding in Foster was the seminal case on the issue). 
152 See Foster, 29 F.3d at 167. 
153 See id. The original complaint contained four counts: (1) negligence—wrongful 
death; (2) negligence—survivorship; (3) strict liability; and (4) breach of warranty. See id. 
The district court granted summary judgment on each of these four counts, but allowed 
the plaintiffs to argue a negligent misrepresentation claim, which the plaintiffs argued was 
alleged in the original complaint, even though the term was not mentioned. See id. at 167 
n.1. The plaintiffs also filed suit against a generic manufacturer, Barre-National Corpora-
tion, believing that Barre had manufactured the generic promethazine that their child was 
given. Id. at 167. The district court granted Barre’s unopposed motion for summary judg-
ment when it was determined that My-K Laboratories, not Barre, manufactured the drug 
that their child consumed. Id.; Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 150, at 3, 
Foster, 29 F.3d 165 (No. 93-1627). The plaintiffs agreed to a dismissal with prejudice of 
their subsequent suit against My-K Laboratories for reasons not stated in the record. Foster, 
29 F.3d at 167. 
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 The Fourth Circuit in Foster rejected the plaintiffs’ negligent mis-
representation claim against the brand name manufacturer for three 
related reasons.154 First, the court viewed the negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim as an attempt to circumvent Maryland’s requirement for 
products liability claims that the defendant manufactured the product 
at issue.155 Second, the court rejected the contention that brand name 
manufacturers are liable to generic consumers because brand name 
manufacturers are aware that generic manufacturers copy their label-
ing.156 Finally, the court held that brand name manufacturers do not 
owe a duty to consumers of another manufacturer’s product.157 As a 
result, Foster established the rule that generic consumers had no right 
of action against brand name manufacturers.158 
 With the exception of two cases—Conte v. Wyeth, a 2008 California 
Court of Appeals case, and Kellogg v. Wyeth, a 2010 case from the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Vermont—every court to address the 
issue has rejected attempts by consumers of generic drugs to sue brand 
name manufacturers because the courts determined that no duty ex-
ists.159 Nearly all of the cases addressing this issue have cited Foster with 
approval.160 
 Arguably, the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Mensing III af-
fected the Foster rule because it undermined the notion that generic 
consumers have a cause of action against generic manufacturers.161 
                                                                                                                      
154 See Foster, 29 F.3d at 168–71. 
155 See id. at 168. 
156 See id. at 170. 
157 See id. at 171. 
158 See id. at 170. 
159 See Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694, 709 (D. Vt. 2010) (holding that a brand 
name manufacturer could be liable to a generic consumer); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 168 Cal. 
App. 4th 89, 114 (Ct. App. 2008) (same). “In the sixteen years since Foster was decided, 
federal district courts sitting in fifteen states, several state trial courts and one intermediate 
court of appeal, have . . . dismissed claims against brand name manufacturers by users of 
the generic form of the drug.” Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 707. 
160 See Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 540 (E.D. Pa. 2006), vacated, 129 
S. Ct. 1578 (2009) (“[A] review of caselaw reveals that every state and federal district court 
which has confronted the issue of innovator drug-manufacturer liability has either adopted 
the Foster reasoning or cited Foster with approval.”). 
161 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2574–75; Foster, 29 F.3d at 169; See supra notes 130–148 
and accompanying text (discussing Mensing III’s holding that generic consumers’ claims 
against generic manufacturers are preempted by FDA regulations). Specifically, the Fourth 
Circuit stated that a generic manufacturer has the ability to change its label “[t]o add or 
strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution or adverse reaction or [t]o delete false, 
misleading or unsupported indications for use or claims for effectiveness without prior 
FDA approval.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Mensing III abrogated this dictum. 131 S. Ct. at 2575. 
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The court in Foster stated, in dicta, that generic consumers had a cause 
of action against generic manufacturers.162 
er.165 
                                                                                                                     
 There is little reason to expect a changed outcome, however, on 
strict liability or breach of warranty claims, because each requires that 
the defendant actually manufactured the product at issue.163 Negli-
gence-based claims, by contrast, do not necessarily have the same rela-
tional requirement, despite the vast majority of cases on this subject 
stating the opposite.164 Nonetheless, all courts to address this issue 
since Mensing III have refused to abandon Fost
 With the exception of courts applying California law and following 
Conte, no court has yet seized the opportunity provided by Mensing III to 
revisit the reasoning of Foster.166 Instead, the cases to address these 
claims have reaffirmed the Foster rule.167 
 
162 Foster, 29 F.3d at 170 (stating that generic manufacturers are able to use the CBE 
process to strengthen a warning, and, “like all other manufacturers, are responsible for the 
representations they make regarding their products”). 
163 See U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315 (2012) (stating that liability for breach of warranty 
can be imposed only on those who sold the product that harmed the plaintiff); Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §§ 1, 9 (1998) (stating that strict tort liability 
applies only to “one who sells” a product); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 402A(1), 
402B (1965); Rostron, supra note 2, at 1140. 
164 See Rostron, supra note 2, at 1169 (stating that the principle that a product manu-
facturer owes no duty to a plaintiff who does not use its product “may be [true] for strict 
liability claims, but . . . [i]n the realm of negligence, it is far less clear that any such princi-
ple exists.”); see also Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 269 (2000) (Explaining that, in 
general, the elements of a negligence claim are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) cause in fact; (4) 
proximate cause; and (5) damages). 
165 See Smith v. Wyeth, 657 F.3d 420, 423 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming Foster); Metz, 830 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1295; Gross v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-00110-AW, 2011 WL 4005266, at *2 (D. 
Md. Sept. 7, 2011). 
166 Compare In re Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., 2012 Wl 
3842271, at *6–7 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2012) (following Conte in applying California law); with 
Smith, 657 F.3d at 424 ( joining the majority of courts following Foster). In a related context, 
however, in 2012 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Bartlett v. Mutual Phar-
maceutical Co., refused to extend Mensing III’s premption of claims against generic manu-
facturers to the design defect realm. Bartlett v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 
2012) (holding generic manufacturers responsible for design defect claims). But see In re 
Pamidronate Prods. Liab. Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 479, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that 
design defect claims against generic manufacturers are preempted under the Mensing III 
rationale). 
167 See, e.g., Smith, 657 F.3d at 423; Hogue v. Pfizer, Inc., 2012 WL 4466609, at *5 (S.D. 
Ohio Sept. 27, 2012); Baymiller v. Ranbaxy Pharm., Inc., 2012 WL 3929768, at *8–9 (D. 
Nev. Sept. 6, 2012); Phares v. Actavis-Elizabeth LLC, 2012 WL 3779227, at *7–11 (S.D. Tex. 
Aug. 30, 2012); Lashley v. Pfizer, Inc., 2012 WL 2459148, at *11 (S.D. Miss. June 27, 2012); 
Phelps v. Wyeth, 857 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1130 (D. Or. 2012); Guarino v. Wyeth LLC, 2012 
WL 1138631, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2012); Metz, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 1295; Gross, 2011 WL 
4005266, at *2. 
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 In one of the first cases to address the issue, in the fall of 2011, the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland in Gross v. Pfizer denied 
the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of a grant of summary judg-
ment for the brand name defendants.168 In Gross, the district court had 
granted summary judgment relying heavily on the Fourth Circuit’s 
holding in Foster, which had also been based on Maryland law.169 On 
motion for reconsideration, however, the district court determined that 
“[t]he Supreme Court’s holding in Mensing III neither created nor ab-
rogated any duty under Maryland law with regard to brand name 
manufacturers.”170 Therefore, the court decided that Mensing III 
changed the outcome of neither Foster nor Gross.171 
 On September 22, 2011, in Smith v. Wyeth, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit became the first appellate court to examine a state 
law claim against brand name manufacturers after the Mensing III deci-
sion.172 The facts in Smith were very similar to those in Mensing III: the 
plaintiffs had taken a generic version of Wyeth’s brand name Reglan for 
a period longer than twelve weeks and had developed tardive dyskinesia 
as a result.173 Relying on Mensing III, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s grant of summary judgment to the generic defendants.174 
As to the brand name defendants, the Sixth Circuit did not even men-
tion any possible effect that Mensing III may have had on the pre-Mensing 
III case law.175 Instead, the court simply followed Foster and its prog-
y.1
                                                                                                                     
en 76 
 Similarly, on November 18, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the 
Middle District of Florida reaffirmed the holding of Foster in Metz v. 
Wyeth.177 Again, where plaintiffs consumed a generic equivalent of 
Wyeth’s Reglan, the district court granted summary judgment to the 
brand name defendants.178 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments 
that Mensing III in any way changed the outcome of Foster, stating that 
the proposition in Foster that consumers could recover from generic 
 
168 See Gross, 2011 WL 4005266, at *2. 
169 See id. at *1–2. 
170 See id. at *2. 
171 See id. 
172 See Smith, 657 F.3d at 424; Sixth Circuit Rejects Brand-Liability Theory Post-Pliva v. Mensing, 
Mayer Brown (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id= 
11949&nid=6. 
173 See Smith, 657 F.3d at 421–22. 
174 See id. at 423. 
175 See id. at 423–24. 
176 See id. at 424. 
177 See Metz, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 1295. 
178 See id. at *1, *3. 
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manufacturers for misrepresentations relating to their products was 
merely dicta and “was by no means central to the ultimate holding in 
Foster.”179 Furthermore, the court noted that federal courts sitting in 
diversity should not adopt innovative theories of state law recovery.180 
III. A Solution: T facturers  
C analyzes the policy justifications 
supporting such an amendment.184 
ing with respect to the 
brand name manufacturers is still good law in California.188 
                                                                                                                     
he FDA Should Allow All Manu
to Use the CBE Process 
 This Part argues for an amendment to the FDA regulations to al-
low drug consumers to successfully sue the manufacturer of the drug 
they consumed—regardless of whether the manufacturer was a brand 
name or generic manufacturer.181 First, Section A explains why courts 
should not allow consumers who take generic drugs to sue brand name 
manufacturers.182 Then, Section B offers a basic outline of how the 
FDA should amend its regulations to make all manufacturers liable to 
their consumers.183 Finally, Section 
A. Conte and Kellogg: The Wrong Prescription 
 In 2008, in Conte v. Wyeth, the California Court of Appeals held that 
a brand name manufacturer could be held liable for injuries resulting 
from the use of another manufacturer’s product.185 The facts of Conte 
were similar to those of Mensing III; in Conte, the plaintiff, Elizabeth 
Conte, developed tardive dyskinesia after taking a generic equivalent of 
Reglan for nearly four years.186 Conte sued both the brand name 
manufacturer, Wyeth, as well as the manufacturers of the generic 
equivalent drug that she actually consumed.187 Although Mensing III 
superseded the court’s disposition with respect to the generic defen-
dants, it appears that the Conte court’s reason
 
d. at *2. 




181 See infra notes 185--256 and accompanying text. 
182 See infra notes 185--207 and accompanying text. 
183 See infra notes 208--228 and accompanying text. 
184 See infra notes 229--256 and accompanying text. 
185 168 Cal. App. 4th 89, 94–95 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
186 Id. at 95; see PLIVA, Inc. v. Men
187 Conte, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 94. 
188 Id. at 114; see Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 (holding that FDA regulations preempt 
failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers). In a 2012 case on unrelated facts, 
O’Neil v. Crane Co., the Supreme Court of California arguably cut back on the expansive 
foreseeability inquiry that the court in Conte proposed. See O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 
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 To succeed on a negligent misrepresentation claim, California law 
requires a plaintiff to establish that: (1) the defendant owed the plain-
tiff a duty; (2) the defendant breached that duty by making a misrepre-
sentation; and (3) the defendant’s actual and reasonable reliance on 
that misrepresentation proximately caused the defendant’s injury.189 
The major legal issue in this and similar cases was whether the first 
element was met; namely, whether a name-brand manufacturer owed a 
duty to a consumer of a generic equivalent.190 
 The Conte court held that the brand name manufacturer Wyeth 
did in fact owe the generic consumer a duty of care.191 Looking to the 
Restatement Second of Torts, as the California Supreme Court had 
done in other negligent misrepresentation cases, the court noted that a 
duty “extends to any person who, in the course of an activity which is in 
furtherance of his own interests, undertakes to give information to an-
other, and knows or should realize that the safety of the person or oth-
ers may depend on the accuracy of the information.”192 The court rea-
soned that it was “eminently foreseeable” that a physician would rely on 
the information provided by Wyeth in prescribing the generic equiva-
lent of Reglan.193 As a result, the court held that Wyeth owed a duty to 
consumers of generics, such as Conte.194 
                                                                                                                      
987, 995 (holding that aircraft valve and pump manufacturers “had no duty to warn of 
risks arising from other manufacturers’ products”). Nonetheless, the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Kentucky, applying California law in its 2012 opinion in In re Darvo-
cet, Darvon & Propoxyphene Products Liability Litigation, did not view O’Neil as limiting the 
holding in Conte. In re Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., 2012 WL 
3842271, at *6 n.6 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2012) (“If the California Supreme Court had wished 
to overrule Conte, it could have done so explicitly. The reason for the O’Neil court’s com-
plete lack of citation to Conte is, therefore, most likely that the court believed the case to be 
irrelevant to determination of the issue at hand.”). 
189 Garcia v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 960, 960, 963 (Cal. 1990); Respondent Wyeth’s 
Brief at 12, Conte, 168 Cal. App. 4th 89 (No. A117353). 
190 See Conte, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 114. 
191 Id. at 103–07, 114. The court in Conte first distinguished strict products liability 
cases, which require the plaintiff actually to have used a product produced by the defen-
dant, from negligence-based cases, which do not have such a requirement. See id. at 100–
02. The court explicitly rejected the notion from Foster that the plaintiff was arguing a strict 
products liability case masquerading as a negligence claim. Compare Foster v. Am. Home 
Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that the plaintiffs were attempting 
“to circumvent” the requirements of strict products liability by bringing a negligent mis-
representation claim), with Conte, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 101 (determining that there is “no 
logical or legal inconsistency between allowing the suit for negligence and disallowing the 
suit for strict products liability”). 
192 See id. at 104 (citing Garcia, 50 Cal. 3d at 728, 735 (quoting Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 311, cmt. b, at 106)). 
193 See Conte, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 105. 
194 See id. at 114. 
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 Similarly, in the 2010 case, Kellogg v. Wyeth, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Vermont held that a brand name manufacturer could 
foresee the injury to generic consumers, and therefore owed those con-
sumers a duty of reasonable care.195 As in Conte and Mensing III, the 
plaintiff’s doctor in Kellogg prescribed Reglan, which a pharmacist filled 
with a generic version of metoclopramide.196 Rejecting the strict liabil-
ity requirement that the defendant actually sold the product in ques-
tion to the plaintiff, the court found that it is “entirely foreseeable[] 
that a physician will prescribe a drug in reliance upon information dis-
seminated by the brand name manufacturer, and that the patient will 
receive and ingest a generic equivalent.”197 
                                                                                                                     
 Courts have correctly been reluctant to follow the reasoning of 
Conte and Kellogg for two primary reasons.198 First, federal courts adju-
dicating state law issues have been reluctant to rewrite state law.199 
Moreover, in some states, courts are bound by the statutes declaring 
that where a product causes an injury, the claim will be governed by 
that state’s strict products liability rules.200 Thus, courts have generally 
joined the majority of other states on the issue, viewing Conte and Kel-
logg as an aberration.201 
 
195 Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694, 706 (D. Vt. 2010), 762 F. Supp. 2d at 706. 
196 See id. at 697–98. 
197 See id. at 706. 
198 See Smith v. Wyeth, 657 F.3d 420, 424 (6th Cir. 2011) (joining the “majority” of courts 
disagreeing with Conte and Kellogg); infra notes 199–207 and accompanying text. 
199 See Foster, 29 F.3d at 171 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) 
(“As a federal court sitting in diversity, we must apply the applicable state law as it now 
exists.”)). 
200 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-1(b)(2) (West 2000) (“‘Product liability action’ 
means any claim or action brought by a claimant for harm caused by a product, irrespec-
tive of the theory underlying the claim . . . .”); Smith, 657 F.3d at 423 (holding that Ky. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 411.300(1) (West 2010) controls all Kentucky damage claims resulting from 
the use of products, regardless of the legal theory advanced, and requires that the defen-
dant's product caused the plaintiff's injury); Phelps v. Wyeth, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 
1121 (D. Or. 2012) (“Oregon courts have found that ORS § 30.900 [Oregon’s product 
liability statute] includes all theories a plaintiff may bring in an action based on a product 
defect. Consequently, Oregon product liability law is controlling here, and it does not al-
low for name-brand manufacturer liability unless Mrs. Phelps can demonstrate that the 
name-brand manufacturers’ products caused her injury.”) (internal citations omitted). 
201 See, e.g., Fisher v. Pelstring, No. 09-252, 2010 WL 2998474, at *7 (D.S.C. July 28, 
2010) (noting “that Conte is in direct conflict with the weight of authority in the courts that 
have addressed the issue”); Finnicum v. Wyeth, 708 F. Supp. 2d 616, 621 (E.D. Tex. 2010); 
see also Martin, supra note 4, at 475 (“The question now is whether Conte will become the 
leading case on brand name manufacturers’ liability to users of generic drugs using a neg-
ligent misrepresentation theory, or whether it remains an isolated anomaly.”). 
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 Second, most courts have found that to hold brand name manu-
facturers responsible for generic consumers would push the concept of 
foreseeability too far.202 Embedded in the foreseeability inquiry, courts 
have looked at fundamental fairness, finding that it would be unfair to 
hold a brand name manufacturer liable for a product from which it did 
not profit.203 
 As a policy matter, although drug labeling might improve if brand 
name manufacturers were held liable to all consumers, it is also likely 
that fewer drugs would be discovered and marketed.204 Manufacturers 
would consider lawsuit awards as costs of doing business, but at some 
point, as costs increase and potential revenue streams decrease, some 
manufacturers would likely choose not to invest in product develop-
ment.205 From an economic perspective, this is not necessarily ineffi-
cient because firms should consider the true costs of their products 
when making production decisions.206 Nonetheless, these costs should 
be borne by each of the manufacturers who created the risks—that is, 
each manufacturer should be liable only to its own customers.207 
B. Amending the FDA Regulations to Allow Generic Manufacturers  
to Enhance a Warning Through the CBE Process 
 The FDA should amend its regulations to allow generic manufac-
turers to strengthen a warning through the “changes-being-effected” 
(“CBE”) process.208 This would provide generic manufacturers with a 
means to change a warning label without prior FDA approval.209 Such a 
                                                                                                                      
202 See Foster, 29 F.3d at 171 (“We think to impose a duty in the circumstances of this 
case would be to stretch the concept of foreseeability too far.”); Couick v. Wyeth, 691 F. 
Supp. 2d 643, 646 (W.D.N.C. 2010). 
203 See, e.g., Foster, 29 F.3d at 170. 
204 See infra note 205 and accompanying text. 
205 See Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Industrial Profile of the Links Between Product Li-
ability and Innovation, in The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on Safety 
and Innovation 81, 114 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) (“Higher levels of 
liability costs usually increase product-related research and development. However, ex-
tremely high levels of liability dampen innovation as firms reduce their focus on new 
product development.”). 
206 See Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 127 (1987) (“[I]f li-
able parties pay for the actual level of losses they cause, they will be led to act optimally 
under liability rules.”). 
207 See infra notes 208–256 and accompanying text. 
208 See infra notes 209–256 and accompanying text. 
209 See Wyeth v. Levine (Levine III ), 555 U.S. 555, 568 (2009) (describing the CBE proc-
ess, which currently allows brand name manufacturers unilaterally to update their warning 
labels to “add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction” 
(quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) (2012))). 
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change would nullify Mensing III and allow generic consumers to sue 
generic manufacturers for failure to warn.210 Allowing generic consum-
ers to sue generic manufacturers incentivizes all manufacturers to 
strengthen warning labels upon discovering new adverse information, 
thus increasing safety for consumers.211 
 A new FDA regulation should treat brand name and generic 
manufacturers identically for purposes of post-market risks.212 The 
regulation should do three things: (1) create a database for adverse in-
cident reporting, accessible to all manufacturers of a drug, and require 
all manufacturers to monitor the reports; (2) allow all manufacturers to 
strengthen a warning label unilaterally; and (3) require sameness 
among all manufacturers’ labels.213 As a result of such regulation, con-
sumers of generic drugs would be able to sue the generic manufactur-
ers.214 
 The first requirement—to create a common database for adverse 
incident reporting—would provide all manufacturers with the same 
information as it is reported.215 After the initial approval process, brand 
name manufacturers do not have a comparative advantage over the ge-
neric manufacturers in terms of interpreting new data.216 The brand 
                                                                                                                      
 
210 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2577–78. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court in PLIVA, 
Inc. v. Mensing (Mensing III ) held that the FDA regulations preempted state law failure-to-
warn claims against generic manufacturers because it was impossible for generic manufac-
turers to comply with both their state law duty to change a label and their federal law duty 
to keep the label the same. Id. It was not enough that the generic manufacturers had the 
ability to request a label change from the FDA as that would not have satisfied their state 
law duty to provide adequate labeling—the state law duty could only be fulfilled through a 
unilateral ability to change the label. Id. 
211 See Mensing III Brief for Respondents, supra note 144, at 20 (arguing that “[i]f ge-
neric drug manufacturers did not share in responsibility for ensuring the adequacy of 
drug warnings, there would often be no one left ‘minding the store’”). 
212 See infra notes 215–228 and accompanying text (describing how to achieve such a 
result); infra notes 229–256 and accompanying text (arguing that brand name and generic 
manufacturers should each be liable to their respective consumers). 
213 See infra notes 215–228 and accompanying text. 
214 Cf. Levine III, 555 U.S. at 573 (holding that the FDA regulations do not preempt 
state law failure-to-warn claims because brand name manufacturers could unilaterally 
strengthen a warning through the CBE regulation). 
215 See David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Pre-
empt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 Geo. L.J. 461, 489–90 (2008) (discussing the FDA Amendments 
Act’s attempt to strengthen the FDA’s ability to conduct post-approval surveillance). Under 
the current system, the FDA requires manufacturers to gather adverse reaction reports 
through its Adverse Event Reporting System (“AERS”). Id. at 489. 
216 See Catherine D. DeAngelis & Phil B. Fontanarosa, Prescription Drugs, Products Liabil-
ity, and Preemption of Tort Litigation, 300 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 1939, 1939 (2008) (stating that 
the safety and effectiveness profile of a drug may be dramatically different ten years after 
its initial approval due to the data received from a wider population of patients). The small 
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name manufacturer has supplied all its relevant data to the FDA in or-
der to gain pre-market approval, and thus any new information could 
equally be interpreted by a generic manufacturer with the same infor-
mation.217 Currently, the FDA and the brand name manufacturers re-
ceive most, if not all, adverse incident reports.218 As a result, it is highly 
unlikely that a generic manufacturer would have the information nec-
essary to implement a label change.219 Under the new regulation, how-
ever, all manufacturers would see and be required to monitor the same 
information.220 
 Second, in order to override Mensing III, a new regulation would 
need to explicitly state that all manufacturers are allowed to strengthen 
a warning label unilaterally.221 In holding that FDA regulations pre-
empt failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers, the Court in 
Mensing III relied on the FDA’s own interpretation of its regulations, 
stating that generic manufacturers could not unilaterally update a 
                                                                                                                      
sample size for pre-market clinical trials “virtually guarantees” that new risks will emerge 
after initial FDA approval. See id. Because such data emerges after the drug’s initial appli-
cation, a generic manufacturer and the original brand name manufacturer are equally 
able to interpret this new data. See id. 
217 See id. 
218 See Oral Argument at 23:31, Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-
1501), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2010/2010_09_993#argument 
(describing how brand name manufacturers, not generic manufacturers, typically receive 
adverse event reports); Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS), U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 
(last updated Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory 
Information/Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/default.htm (describing how the FDA util-
izes the data it receives through the AERS system to update labeling or restrict use of a 
drug). 
219 See Oral Argument, supra note 218, at 23:31. An attorney for the generic manufac-
turers in Mensing III argued: 
[G]enerics rarely even get adverse reports because if a doctor prescribes a 
drug, the doctor prescribes it as the brand, and then checks off the box that 
says a generic can be issued. If a patient comes and tells him about an adverse 
report, the doctor has no idea which generic of the 15 that might be in the 
market actually was dispensed, so he’ll actually tell the brand company. He’ll 
report the adverse event to the brand company. 
Id. 
220 See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
221 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2577–79; supra notes 91–100 and accompanying text 
(summarizing Levine III’s holding that FDA regulations do not preempt failure-to-warn 
claims against brand name manufacturers because brand name manufacturers can en-
hance a warning label unilaterally); supra notes 130–148 (summarizing Mensing III’s hold-
ing that FDA regulations preempt failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers 
because generic manufacturers cannot enhance a warning label unilaterally). 
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warning label.222 If, however, generic manufacturers have the same abil-
ity unilaterally to change a label as brand name manufacturers, then 
FDA regulations would not preempt failure-to-warn claims against any 
manufacturer.223 
 Third, a new regulation must require sameness among all manu-
facturers’ labels to lessen consumer confusion.224 The FDA currently 
requires sameness “to preclude a basis for lack of confidence in the 
equivalency of generic versus brand name products.”225 If, for example, 
a brand name manufacturer enhanced its warning label but a generic 
manufacturer did not copy the change, the different labels would 
impermissibly suggest that the two drugs have different effects.226 Cur-
rently, however, the brand name drug is the leader in making changes, 
and sameness is only required of the generic manufacturers.227 If, how-
ever, all manufacturers are able to change a label unilaterally, then even 
brand name manufacturers should be required to match the same la-
bel.228 
C. The Argument for Holding Generic Manufacturers Liable 
 The current system, under which generic manufacturers are liable 
to no one and generic consumers have no remedy, is neither politically 
nor economically desirable.229 It is hard to imagine a public policy justi-
                                                                                                                      
 
222 See id. at 2575 (“The [FDA] interprets the CBE regulation to allow changes to ge-
neric drug labels only when a generic drug manufacturer changes its label to match an 
updated brand name label or to follow the FDA’s instructions.”); supra notes 132–142 and 
accompanying text (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s reliance in Mensing III on the 
FDA’s interpretation of its own regulations). 
223 See id. at 2579. The Court in Mensing III held that federal regulations preempted 
state law failure-to-warn claims when a manufacturer could only ask the FDA to change a 
label, but not when the manufacturer had the unilateral ability to change the label without 
prior FDA approval. See id. 
224 See U.S. Mensing III Brief, supra note 57, at 4. 
225 Id. (quoting U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Division of Generic Drugs, Policy and 
Procedure Guide 37 (1989)). 
226 See id. 
227 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (2012) (requiring all manufacturers to update labels through 
the CBE process); see Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2575 (stating that generic manufacturers can 
only use the CBE process to update a label to match a brand name manufacturer’s up-
dated label). 
228 See U.S. Mensing III Brief, supra note 57, at 4. If a brand name manufacturer were al-
lowed to maintain its original label after a generic manufacturer changed its labeling, then 
the policy requiring sameness would be undermined. See id. (emphasizing the importance 
of sameness). 
229 See infra notes 230–256 and accompanying text. Indeed, U.S. Representative Henry 
A. Waxman wrote a letter requesting that the Commissioner of the FDA respond to the 
Mensing III decision by “devising a system that both permits consumers injured by the use 
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fication for forcing injured patients to bear the burden of negligently 
labeled drugs.230 Furthermore, without an incentive for all manufac-
turers to provide adequate warning labels, manufacturers may opt to 
provide less-than-adequate warnings.231 If so, patients may choose to 
forego certain medical treatments if they do not trust drug labeling to 
warn them of dangerous risks associated with the drug.232 Clearly, this 
outcome undermines the very basis for drug patent legislation: if pa-
tients will not consume the drug, then there is no purpose for the in-
novation.233 
                                                                                                                     
 The current system of no liability for generic manufacturers is not 
only unfair to consumers, but may lead to weaker warning labels.234 
Under the current no-liability scheme, generic manufacturers have no 
incentive to reduce injuries.235 Generally, the costs of injury avoidance 
for a drug manufacturer include both the costs of monitoring and re-
porting of adverse reactions as well as the costs of lost sales to consum-
ers who will not consume the drug because of the stronger warning 
 
of a generic drug to seek a remedy in court and ensures that the labels of generic drugs 
are the same as those of their brand name counterparts.” Letter from Henry A. Waxman, 
Ranking Member, U.S. House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, to Margaret Hamburg, 
Comm’r, The Food & Drug Admin. (Apr. 11, 2012), http://democrats.energycommerce. 
house.gov/index.php?q=news/waxman-urges-fda-for-proper-revisions-in-light-of-supreme-
court-ruling. 
230 See Erin Fuchs, FDA Could Make Generics Liable Amid Push to Undo Mensing, Law 360 
(Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.faegrebdc.com/webfiles/FDA%20Could%20Make%20Generics 
%20Liable%20Amid%20Push%20To%20Undo%20Mensing.pdf (describing the “recent 
public outcry” over the Supreme Court’s decision in Mensing III, which made this outcome a 
reality). 
231 See infra notes 235–238 and accompanying text. 
232 See Shavell, supra note 206, at 11, 51–54. “[I]njurers will not take care in the ab-
sence of liability, and the outcome will therefore generally depart from the optimal. How-
ever, because victims will bear their accident losses, they will have a reason to take care.” Id. 
at 11. Thus, patients will “take care” by choosing not to engage in the risky activity—
consuming the potentially mislabeled drugs. See id. 
233 See Hatch-Waxman Hearing, supra note 52, at 1–2 (promoting the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments by touting the innovation of beneficial new drugs that would be increased by 
an extended patent term). 
234 See infra notes 235–249 and accompanying text. 
235 See Shavell, supra note 206, at 53 (stating that, assuming consumers’ knowledge of 
risk is imperfect, firms will not take care to reduce injuries). Brand name manufacturers, 
of course, still have an incentive to provide non-negligent labeling. See Levine III, 555 U.S. 
at 581 (holding brand name manufacturers liable to brand name consumers). With ge-
neric drugs representing seventy-five percent of the market, however, and brand name 
manufacturers only liable to their customers, brand name manufacturers have a lower 
incentive to investigate post-approval reports and update their label. See Mensing III, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating that generic drugs represent seventy-five 
percent of the market); Smith, 657 F.3d at 424 ( joining “the majority of courts” in denying 
generic consumers a remedy from brand name manufacturers). 
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label.236 Generic drug manufacturers under the current scheme can 
avoid these costs altogether because they do not have to monitor ad-
verse reactions, nor do they risk losing customers because of strength-
ened warning labels.237 
 The FDA should set up a system of incentives to uncover adverse 
reaction information and ensure that such information is properly re-
flected in drug labeling.238 The tort system can provide such incentives 
that deter unwanted behavior.239 The tort system incentivizes manufac-
turers to strengthen warnings by allowing tort claims against manufac-
turers when the probability of harm from an inadequate warning is 
greater than the burden of enhancing the warning—that is, when the 
manufacturer is negligent.240 
 If each manufacturer (brand name and generic) were liable to 
their own customers for inadequate warnings, then each manufacturer 
would have an incentive to update warning labels so that they ade-
quately warn of risks.241 Assuming that the FDA continues to require 
sameness among brand name and generic drug labeling, either all 
manufacturers will have an adequate label or all manufacturers will 
have an inadequate label.242 If all manufacturers have an inadequate 
label, then each will face an expected liability cost equal to the total 
damages caused by the inadequate warning multiplied by the manufac-
                                                                                                                      
236 Cf. James F. Thrasher et al., Estimating the Impact of Different Cigarette Package Warning 
Label Policies: The Auction Method, 32 Addictive Behavs. 2916, 2922–23 (2007) (finding 
that stronger warnings on cigarette packages discourage consumer purchases). 
237 See Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 (preempting claims against generic manufactur-
ers); Shavell, supra note 206, at 11 (stating that “injurers will not take care in the absence 
of liability”). 
238 See supra notes 208–228 and accompanying text (describing the framework re-
quired for and FDA regulation to achieve this result). 
239 See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really 
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 377, 378 (1994) (“[D]eterrence has now assumed the role of a 
primary rationale for tort liability rules.”). 
240 See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); Schwartz, su-
pra note 239, at 378. This is a reformulation of Judge Learned Hand’s classic calculus of 
negligence. See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173 (stating that a behavior is negligent when B 
< PL, where B represents the defendant’s burden, and P represents the probability of the 
injury, L, occurring). The burden of enhancing a label includes not only the cost of moni-
toring and reporting adverse reactions, but also the costs of reduced sales to consumers 
who would have consumed the drug with the lesser warning, but not with the stronger 
warning. Cf. Thrasher et al., supra note 236, at 2922–23 (describing how a stronger warn-
ing label on a cigarette package decreases sales). 
241 See Shavell, supra note 206, at 8 (stating that under a negligence standard, injurers 
will want to take due care to avoid liability). 
242 See U.S. Mensing III Brief, supra note 57, at 4 (describing FDA policy favoring same-
ness). 
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turer’s individual market share.243 In contrast, if each of the manufac-
turers has an adequate label, then they will not be liable and will face 
only the costs of accident avoidance.244 Given that the expected liability 
cost will always be higher than the costs of accident avoidance, manu-
facturers will have an incentive to provide adequate warnings.245 
 Although it would be economically efficient to have only one 
manufacturer bear the accident avoidance costs, requiring more manu-
facturers to bear such costs promotes better labeling.246 The current 
scheme (in which only the brand name manufacturer bears the acci-
dent avoidance costs) is more efficient because it requires only one 
manufacturer to monitor adverse reports and update its label.247 Al-
though less efficient, a system whereby all manufacturers were required 
to monitor reports and update labels would lessen the likelihood of 
inadequate warnings.248 With more manufacturers analyzing the data, 
it is more likely that suboptimal labels will be corrected.249 
                                                                                                                     
 Furthermore, there is no principled way to determine which 
manufacturer should be the single manufacturer to bear the monitor-
ing and reporting costs.250 The system could leave the duty solely on 
the brand name manufacturer, extending that manufacturer’s liability 
to generic consumers, but this would unfairly penalize the brand name 
 
243 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 9 J. Legal Stud. 517, 522 (1980) (noting that where more than one injurer 
was negligent, each injurer’s expected liability costs are its expected share of damages mul-
tiplied by the total damage). Thus, manufacturers with larger market share face higher 
expected liability costs because they are liable to more consumers. See id. 
244 See id. In this context, accident avoidance costs refer to the costs that a manufac-
turer incurs in order to provide an adequate label. See id. at 521. These costs include the 
costs of monitoring and analyzing data about risks of the drug and also include the lost 
sales to consumers who choose not to consume the drug because of the stronger warning 
label. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973) (rea-
soning that “the user or consumer is entitled to make his own choice as to whether the 
product's utility or benefits justify exposing himself to the risk of harm”). 
245 See Landes & Posner, supra note 243, at 524. To see why this must be so, consider 
that if the costs of accident avoidance were higher than the expected harm, the manufac-
turer would be non-negligent for failing to provide a stronger warning. See id. 
246 See id. at 520 (“If, ex ante, each defendant bears a cost (an expected cost) of liabil-
ity, each defendant is deterred, even if ex post all but one pay nothing.”). 
247 See Landes & Posner, supra note 243, at 526. Specifically, “optimal care requires that 
only one of the tortfeasors take care—the one whose costs of care are lower.” Id. In the 
context of post-market risk identification, however, there is no reason to believe that the 
costs of accident avoidance to a brand name manufacturer are lower than the costs to a 
generic manufacturer. See id. 
248 See id.; supra notes 234–247 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra notes 234–247 and accompanying text. 
250 See infra notes 251–253 and accompanying text. 
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manufacturer.251 There is no evidence that after a drug’s initial ap-
proval the brand name manufacturer has a comparative advantage over 
the generic manufacturers in monitoring adverse reactions and re-
questing label updates.252 Furthermore, if each manufacturer were re-
quired to report adverse events to a common database, then each 
manufacturer would have the same risk information available.253 
 Generic manufacturers may be more reluctant to produce generic 
equivalents of drugs if they are held liable for inadequately labeled 
drugs.254 Whereas some manufacturers might stop producing generics, 
others would probably allocate some amount of funding to doing their 
own monitoring of the drugs and then make label changes when ap-
propriate to avoid state law liability.255 Although this would increase the 
cost of such generic drugs—an outcome the Hatch-Waxman Amend-
ments were designed to avoid—it would have the salutary effect of en-
hancing warnings.256 
                                                                                                                      
251 See Foster, 29 F.3d at 170. 
Name brand manufacturers undertake the expense of developing pioneer 
drugs, performing the studies necessary to obtain premarketing approval, 
and formulating labeling information. Generic manufacturers avoid these 
expenses by duplicating successful pioneer drugs and their labels. . . . [It] 
would be especially unfair [to hold a brand name manufacturer liable to a 
generic consumer] when, as here, the generic manufacturer reaps the bene-
fits of the name brand manufacturer's statements by copying its labels and 
riding on the coattails of its advertising. The premarketing approval scheme 
Congress established for generic equivalents of previously approved drugs 
cannot be construed to create liability of a name brand manufacturer when 
another manufacturer's drug has been consumed. 
Id. 
252 See David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 Rev. Econ. 
& Stat. 37, 38 (2005) (noting that generic manufacturers, not just brand name manufac-
turers, must often conduct additional testing before gaining FDA approval); supra note 216 
and accompanying text. Because generic manufacturers must conduct additional testing 
before FDA approval, they are often aware of many of the same risks as a brand name 
manufacturer even before they begin manufacturing the drug. See id. 
253 See supra notes 215–220 and accompanying text (proposing that the FDA amend its 
regulations to include a mandatory common database for adverse incident reporting). 
254 See Brief of the Generic Pharmaceutical Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, at 3, Mensing III, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501) (arguing that 
“exposing generic manufacturers to state tort liability will adversely affect the industry 
[and] drive up costs for no salutary purpose”). 
255 See Shavell, supra note 206, at 8. 
256 See Hatch-Waxman Hearing, supra note 52, at 1–2; Shavell, supra note 206, at 8. 
2012] Generic Drug Consumers, the FDA, and Failure-to-Warn Claims 2001 
Conclusion 
 The FDA should amend its regulations to allow generic manufac-
turers to enhance warning labels unilaterally, and thus allow state law 
failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers to lie. The current 
outcome—in which generic consumers ultimately bear the cost of in-
adequately labeled drugs—is clearly wrong from a policy perspective. 
Instead, each manufacturer should be liable to its own customers. 
 The Supreme Court’s decisions in Wyeth v. Levine and PLIVA v. 
Mensing, however, establish that the current FDA regulations create this 
disparate treatment for brand name and generic consumers. As a re-
sult, the onus should be on the FDA to correct this predicament. 
Allison Stoddart 
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